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Individual Rights in the Work Place: 
The Burger Court and Labor Law 
Theodore J. St. Antoine 
The Supreme Court, like other institutions, must play the part that the 
times demand, often with small regard for the personal predilections of its 
membership. The Warren Court and the Burger Court, in their respective 
contributions to the law of union-employer-employee relations, almost re-
versed the roles they might have been expected to assume. The major 
accomplishment of the Court in the labor area during the Warren era was 
a fundamental restructuring of intergovernmental relationships,' while the 
Court's overriding concern throughout the Burger decade of the 1970s and 
beyond has been the defining of individual rights in the work place. 
During its first thirteen years the Burger Court averaged about a dozen 
noteworthy labor decisions a term. Over half of these, or eighty-six by my 
count, dealt with the rights of employees vis-a-vis their employers or unions, 
as distinguished from the more conventional competing claims of employers 
and labor organizations. By far the largest single category consisted of 
sixty-five cases of alleged discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, 
national origin or age. Twenty-one other decisions covered employees' rights 
to fair representation by their bargaining agents or their rights as union 
members. By contrast, the Warren legacy contains about five times as many 
leading cases dealing with traditional labor-management disputes as with 
individual rights in employment. 2 
The changing pattern of the Supreme Court's labor agenda over the past 
three decades was entirely natural. When Warren Burger became chief 
justice in 1969, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was almost 
thirty-five years old, and the main interpretive lines of union-management 
law had already been laid down. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
covering equal employment opportunity, had been in effect for only four 
years, however, and the first cases arising under it were just beginning 
to reach the Supreme Court. Race and sex discrimination are covered ex-
tensively elsewhere in this volume. 3 But one category of Title VII decision 
so dramatically juxtaposes traditional labor relations values and the new 
values of equal employment opportunity that it calls for discussion here. 
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND SENIORITY 
Aside from affirmative action or "reverse discrimination," the most painful 
and persistent clash of worthy interests resulting from antidiscrimination 
legislation has been presented by the problem of seniority. The essence of 
seniority, of course, is to give preference to more experienced workers in 
such employment decisions as layoffs, recalls, and promotions and also in 
such benefits as step increases in pay, length of vacations, and amount of 
pension. In part the notion is that the veteran employee is entitled as a 
matter of equity to greater job security than newer recruits. In part the 
aim is to remove a source of worker discontent by substituting an objective 
standard for job priorities in place of what might otherwise be arbitrariness 
or favoritism by employer or union. 
The leaders of the AFL-CIO and several major international unions were 
among the prime movers for the inclusion of an equal employment oppor-
tunity title in the 1964 Civil Rights Act.< Opponents sought to rally grass-
roots union opposition by flooding thousands of locals with warnings that 
the enactment of Title VII would "destroy" the hard-earned seniority rights 
of many workers. The AFL-CIO and legislators backing the bill responded 
by assuring union members and the Congress that Title VII would have no 
adverse impact on acquired seniority. The principle of "last hired, first fired" 
would apply "even in the case where owing to discrimination prior to the 
effective date of the title, white workers had more seniority than Negroes. "5 
Further to allay concerns, section 703(h) was added to the bill, providing 
that it would not be an unfair employment practice for an employer to 
differentiate in terms of employment "pursuant to a bona fide seniority 
. . . system, provided that such differences are not the result of an inten-
tion to discriminate. "• 
Since disinterested observers of the 1964 civil rights debate in Congress 
believed AFL-CIO support was crucial to success, these reassurances were 
probably the price that had to be paid for the enactment of Title VII. Yet 
the continuation of seniority systems without any change would leave black 
workers severely handicapped. A black employee moving into a formerly 
lily-white department or line of progression would start with zero seniority. 
He would be the first laid off, the last recalled, and the last promoted. 
The racial discrimination of the past prevented the black worker from earn-
ing seniority credits in jobs traditionally held by whites, and now lack of 
them would hobble his efforts to step into better positions even after the 
racial bars were removed. 
This "perpetuation of the effects of past discrimination" proved too much 
to swallow for most of the federal trial and appellate courts that first en-
countered it. 7 The initial cases arose in plants or shops where "departmental" 
or "job" seniority prevailed, rather than seniority based on total time in 
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the plant. Almost invariably the courts found that making post-act determina-
tions regarding such matters as layoffs, recalls, or promotions on the basis 
of pre-act seniority credits acquired under discriminatory job conditions 
constituted violations of Title VII. Even though the act was not retroactive, 
Congress could not have meant to "freeze an entire generation of Negro 
employees into discriminatory patterns that existed before the Act. "8 Section 
703(h) was disposed of by saying that a "racially discriminatory seniority 
system" existing prior to the act was not "bona fide." Concededly, the 
victims of pre-act discrimination who were never hired at all could not 
later claim credit for the time they might otherwise have worked. But 
blacks who were actually employed in a plant in a segregated department 
or line of progression could demand that the seniority they had acquired 
in their black jobs be accorded "equal status with time worked in white 
jobs."9 In short, Congress was viewed as preserving only "plant" seniority, 
not "job" or "departmental" seniority when the latter would carry forward 
credits obtained under pre-act discriminatory conditions. 
This distinction makes much sense as a matter of policy. Unfortunately, 
there is not a hint in the legislative history that Congress ever entertained 
such a distinction. The function of seniority to protect the equity of veteran 
workers in their jobs and to provide an objective standard for employment 
preferences is essentially the same whether the seniority is linked to a 
particular job, or a given department, or a whole plant. Be that as it may, 
by the early 1970s the battle over seniority under Title VII seemed finished. 
The vast majority of federal rulings had struck down seniority systems that 
"perpetuated the effects" of pre-act discrimination. The Supreme Court had 
denied certiorari. In 1972 Congress undertook a comprehensive revision of 
Title VII10 and did nothing to overturn the seniority decisions. Eventually, 
the view that Title VII reached seniority systems perpetuating pre-act dis-
crimination was accepted by six courts of appeals in the holdings of thirty 
cases and by two other courts of appeals in dicta, all without dissent. 11 
Understandably, most sensible lawyers counselled their clients to settle 
claims, even with million-dollar price tags. Only the diehards fought on. 
Then, in 1977, the Supreme Court dropped its bombshell. In Teamsters 
v. United States [T.I.M.E.-D.C.], 12 the Court broke with the long line of 
lower court precedent and held, 7 to 2, that section 703(h) does indeed 
sustain "bona fide" seniority plans, regardless of their perpetuation of the 
effects of prior discrimination. Speaking for the majority, Justice Stewart 
began by agreeing that Title VII reached practices "fair in form, but dis-
criminatory in operation," and acknowledged the perpetuation of the effects 
of pre-act discrimination fitted that prescription. He added: "Were it not 
for § 703(h), the seniority system in this case would seem to fall." 13 "But," 
he proceeded, "both the literal terms of§ 703(h) and the legislative history 
of Title VII demonstrate that Congress considered this very effect of many 
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seniority systems and extended a measure of immunity to them." Justice 
Stewart found no support in the legislative history and "no rational basis" 
for distinguishing between discriminatees employed in less desirable jobs 
and those denied employment entirely. He recognized that only "bona fide" 
seniority plans are immunized by section 703(h), but pointed out that the 
plan challenged in Teamsters applied equally to all races and ethnic groups. 
Whites as well as blacks and Hispanics were "locked" into jobs as city 
drivers and servicemen and were discouraged from transferring to superior 
highway jobs. The employer's separate seniority units for highway drivers 
and for others was in accord with rational industry practice, did not have 
its "genesis in racial discrimination," and had been "maintained free from 
any illegal purpose." 14 
Justice Stewart's opinion was a sound, lawyerly product, the opinion that 
should have been written in 1970. The question is whether it was wise 
judicial statesmanship in 1977. There is little doubt that he reflected the 
thinking (and perhaps the nonthinking) of the Congress of 1964. But time 
had passed. Unions, employers, and white employees had endured their 
defeats and vented their rage. The more accommodating had bowed to the 
seemingly inevitable and worked out the apparently necessary adjustments. 
Neither the Supreme Court nor Congress had intervened. Now, a half dozen 
years after the tumult had begun to die down, the Supreme Court reopened 
the whole roiling controversy in a way that tended both to mock concilia-
tory unions and employers and to revive antagonisms among black and 
white employees. It is understandable that a legal craftsman like Justice 
Stewart may have felt driven to the result he reached by the legislative 
history of Title VII. There is ample precedent, however, for construing an 
earlier statute in light of subsequent legislation dealing with the same sub-
ject. 15 Had it wished, the Court could easily have justified a different decision 
by relying on the discreet yet suggestive silence of Congress in enacting 
the 1972 amendments. 
Having set the clock back to 1964, the Court was then forced to confront 
an even closer legal question regarding seniority systems. Suppose an em-
ployer adopted a facially neutral seniority plan after· the effective date of 
Title VII, but with a resulting discriminatory impact on black workers. 
Arguably, section 703(h) should not immunize such an arrangement, be-
cause that provision was primarily designed to preserve the established 
expectations of white workers concerning the seniority rights they had ac-
quired before Title VII went into effect. Nonetheless, in American Tobacco 
Co. v. Patterson, 16 a 5 to 4 majority of the Court concluded that 703(h) 
was not so limited, and that it applied to sustain post-act as well as pre-
act seniority systems. The dissent properly objected that the specific reason 
given in the legislative debates for the adoption of section 703(h) was the 
desire to protect pre-act seniority credits. Yet the majority could correctly 
respond that 703(h) itself "makes no distinction between pre- and post-act 
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seniority systems," and none of its proponents explicitly indicated such a 
distinction was intended. Patterson quite reasonably could have gone either 
way, and it might well have been decided differently had Justice O'Connor 
not replaced Justice Stewart at the beginning of the 1981 term. 
The upshot of Teamsters [T./.M.E.-D.C.] and Patterson is to place a 
strong judicial imprimatur on the concept of seniority, one of the most 
hallowed values of organized labor, even against the competing claims 
of adversely affected minority groups. Discriminatory impact alone is not 
enough to invalidate a seniority system; an actual intent to discriminate 
must be proved. Moreover, the finding of intent or motive is a pure question 
of fact to be determined by the trial court, reversible only for clear error. 17 
This of course does not mean that a court may not consider disparate 
effects on minorities in resolving the factual issue of discriminatory intent. 
An illustration would be an employer's continued use of separate seniority 
lists for two separate lines of progression which were segregated by race 
but are now desegregated, in a situation where all the jobs are functionally 
related and the normal pattern would call for a single line of progression 
with "line of progression" seniority. Absent such a distortion of customary 
arrangements, however, all traditional and legitimately grounded seniority 
systems now appear immune to challenge under Title VII. To that extent 
the long-term, organized, predominantly white worker has won out over the 
black newcomer to the work place. 
FAIR REPRESENTATION 
In the midst of World War II the Supreme Court for the first time de-
clared that labor organizations have an obligation to represent all the em-
ployees in a bargaining unit fairly and without discrimination. Steele v. Louis-
ville & Nashville R .R. 18 arose under the Railway Labor Act (RLA) and in-
volved racial discrimination by a union and a cooperative employer. Neither 
the RLA nor the National Labor Relations Act expressly imposes any duty 
of fair representation. But each act does make a majority union in any 
bargaining unit the exclusive representative of all the employees, dissenters 
and adherents alike. In Steele the Court concluded that Congress had not 
intended to confer (and under the Constitution probably could not have con-
ferred) this extraordinary power without imposing the concomitant obliga-
tion to protect minority as well as majority interests. The duty of fair 
representation was later extended to the National Labor Relations Act19 and 
to arbitrary treatment on grounds other than race. 20 As soon as judicial review 
of union judgments went beyond such plainly invidious classifications as 
race, different problems of legal definition and of factual assessment could 
have been anticipated. The Burger Court had to confront one of the more 
troublesome. 
A trucking company discharged several drivers for dishonesty, charging 
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that they had sought reimbursement of motel expenses greater than those 
actually incurred. Motel receipts submitted by the drivers were in excess 
of the charges listed on motel records, whose accuracy was verified by 
affidavits from the motel clerk and the motel owner. The drivers suggested 
the motel be investigated, but the union told them "there was nothing 
to worry about." At an arbitration hearing before a joint union-management 
area committee, the employees denied any dishonesty but presented no 
other evidence to contradict the company's documents. The committee up-
held the discharge. Subsequently the employees sued the employer for un-
just discharge in violation of the collective agreement and sued the union 
for unfair representation. In a deposition the motel clerk at last admitted 
he had falsified the motel records and kept the difference between the 
amounts shown there and on the drivers' receipts. The Supreme Court held, 
in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, lnc., 21 that the employer could not rely 
on the finality of the arbitral award as a defense against the employees' 
suit "if the contractual processes have been seriously flawed by the union's 
breach of its duty to represent employees honestly and in good faith and 
without invidious discrimination or arbitrary conduct." 
The standard of representation enunciated in Hines can hardly be faulted 
in the abstract. Yet with the Supreme Court moving beyond the more 
clear-cut instances of discrimination and bad faith to reach "arbitrariness" 
and "perfunctoriness,"22 the lower courts may be tempted to go on to negli-
gence, or at least gross negligence. This would undoubtedly mean greater 
justice for individual employees in given cases, as in Hines. But union 
business agents, not learned in the niceties of due process, must often 
act quickly under pressure, and their customary aim has been the maximiza-
tion of group interests, not the furthest pursuit of every individual claim. 
Moreover, decisions like Hines mean an employer cannot work out a griev-
ance settlement with its employees' statutory bargaining representative which 
will have the same finality as an adjustment reached with a party's lawyer 
or other personally chosen agent. An undue extension of Hines could thus 
impair a union's flexibility and effectiveness in grievance handling and 
undercut its status as the employees' officially designated spokesman in 
dealing with their employer. One might reasonably question whether an in-
creasing judicial scrutiny of union decisions involving matters of judgment 
and discretion bodes well for the total collective bargaining process. 
INTERNAL UNION AFFAIRS 
In the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act 
of 195923 the federal government undertook for the first time a compre-
hensive regulation of internal union affairs. By 1969 and the advent of the 
Burger era, the federal courts of appeals, with an occasional emendation by 
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the Supreme Court, had disposed of many of the most pressing issues 
raised by the new statute. Still, a number of significant questions remained 
unanswered. In addition, a few important decisions of the Burger Court 
interpreting the older National Labor Relations Act dealt more with union-
member relationships than with traditional union-employer relationships. In 
several of these sensitive intraunion areas the Court struck a sound and 
practical, if not always totally satisfying, balance between individual claims 
and institutional interests. 
Free Speech and Union Politics 
Union members are guaranteed a broad right of free speech under the 
Landrum-Griffin Act. They may not be disciplined by their union, for 
example, even for libeling the organization's officers. 24 Despite this far-
reaching protection, the Supreme Court held that a newly elected union 
president could lawfully discharge union-appointed business agents who had 
supported the opposing candidate for the presidency. 25 The Court emphasized 
that the safeguards of the statute apply to rank-and-file members of a labor 
organization and not to union officers or employees as such. Removal as 
a business agent does not affect one's membership status. 
This result is supported by the need for a union president, like any other 
elected politician, to be free to choose those members of his staff who 
will exercise significant responsibility in the day-to-day operations of the 
organization. The Court expressly left open the question of whether it would 
be different if the employees occupied nonpolicymaking and nonconfidential 
positions. Even so, some nagging concerns are left that the analogy to 
civil government may not be entirely congruent. In the one-party system 
that prevails in nearly all labor unions, effective political action often re-
quires the inside access that only an ongoing role in the administration can 
provide. While the Supreme Court's analysis makes good sense under the 
language of the statute, the Court might have been more troubled if it 
had dealt with a successful incumbent who had ousted his own dissenting 
business agents. 
A much more difficult free-speech issue arose in Steelworkers v. Sadlow-
ski.26 In the hotly contested 1977 Steelworkers' election, Edward Sadlowski 
relied heavily on financial contributions from outside the union to offset the 
support his opponent, Lloyd McBride, received from the incumbent leader-
ship and staff. McBride won handily and thereafter the Steelworkers' Con-
vention forbade any candidate for union office to accept "financial support, 
or any other direct or indirect support of any kind" from a nonmember. 
In an opinion written by Justice Marshall, a 5 to 4 Supreme Court majority 
found this outsider rule to be a "reasonable" qualification on free speech 
within the meaning of the proviso to section 10l(a)(2) of Landrum-Griffin. 
Declared the Court: "Although it may limit somewhat the ability of insur-
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gent union members to wage an effective campaign, an interest deserving 
some protection under the statute, it is rationally related to the union's 
legitimate interest in reducing outsider interference with union affairs. "27 
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan and 
Blackmun in dissent, insisted that an absolute ban on nonmember contri-
butions was unnecessary to prevent outsider control and would thwart the 
efforts of challengers in union elections. One may speculate that Justice 
Marshall veered away in this instance from his usual allies in cases in-
volving individual rights because of his acquaintance with the special needs 
of mass movements to maintain their autonomy and avoid alien subversion. 
Curiously, neither majority nor dissent seemed aware that the proviso of 
section 101(a)(2) does not authorize all "reasonable" limitations on free 
speech but only such as relate "to the responsibility of every member toward 
the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that 
would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations." 
The standard examples have been the advocacy of dual unionism, "schism," 
or wildcat strikes; otherwise, the proviso has been tightly confined by the 
lower courts. An unfortunate by-product of Justice Marshall's sweeping 
generalization that the protections of free speech in section 101(a)(2) are 
not equivalent to those in the First Amendment, and his apparent acceptance 
of a "rational basis" test for justifying the outsider rule in Sadlowski, could 
be a reexamination of the scope of union members' freedom of expression 
under Landrum-Griffin. Union administrations may be entitled to con-
siderable deference in the handling of most internal matters, but experience 
demonstrates that little latitude should be allowed in the restriction of dis-
sidents' speech. 
Union Elections 
The Supreme Court has endorsed the secretary of labor's pragmatic ap-
proach toward determining what are "reasonable qualifications" for elective 
union office under Title IV of the Landrum-Griffin Act. If too many mem-
bers (perhaps more than two-thirds) are disqualified by a particular rule or 
combination of rules, the provisions are presumed invalid. The Supreme 
Court agreed in Steelworkers Local 3489 v. Usery28 that a requirement of 
attendance at one-half of a local's meetings during the three years preceding 
an election was unreasonable, where the result was that 96.5 percent of the 
local's 660 members were ineligible. The rule in the abstract may have had 
the legitimate purpose of ensuring knowledgeable and dedicated union 
leaders, but in actual operation it had the antidemocratic effect of restricting 
eligibility too drastically. In order to afford unions an initial opportunity 
to police their own house, however, the Court ruled that the secretary of 
labor may not sue to challenge an election on a ground that the complain-
ing member did not raise previously in an internal protest to the union 
itself. 29 
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Exclusive Representation and Minority Factions 
A labor organization's power of exclusive representation received a major 
boost in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organiza-
tion. 30 Minority employees charged a company with racial discrimination 
in job assignments and the union filed a formal grievance on their behalf. 
Several employees thought the contract procedures were inadequate and 
sought unsuccessfully to have the union picket the store in protest. When 
the company president refused to deal directly with the employees, they 
began picketing on their own, denouncing the store as racist and urging 
a customer boycott. After written warnings failed to deter continued picket-
ing, two ringleaders were discharged. In an opinion written by Justice 
Marshall, from which only Justice Douglas dissented, the Supreme Court 
held that the dismissals did not violate the employees' rights of "industrial 
self-determination" guaranteed by section 7 of the NLRA. Their attempts 
to bypass the established grievance machinery and engage in separate bar-
gaining with their employer were in derogation of the union's exclusive 
representational authority under section 9(a) of the act and cost them the 
protection of section 7. Justice Marshall left open the question of whether 
the discharges might have violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 
Black employees' distrust of predominantly white union representatives 
reached a peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Blacks formed separate 
caucuses within a number of major unions and often demanded separate 
representation in contract negotiations and grievance arbitrations. Such ac-
tions were understandable. But they constituted a grave threat to the whole 
structure of American collective bargaining and to its linchpin, the union's 
power of exclusive representation. Speaking with the special weight lent 
by the voice of Justice Marshall, the Court in Emporium set itself athwart 
these fractionating forces. Whether or not Emporium was the turning point, 
the assault on exclusive representation receded with the passing of the 
1970s. 
Union Security and Political Action 
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 31 the Burger Court finally con-
fronted and resolved a constitutional issue that the Warren Court had avoided 
only through strained statutory interpretation sixteen years earlierY Abood, 
in line with private sector precedents, sustained the constitutionality of a 
Michigan statute authorizing the negotiation of "agency shop" agreements 
under which public employees had to pay a service fee to the union, to the 
extent the service charges were used to finance collective bargaining, con-
tract administration, and grievance adjustment. Then, reaching the long-
mooted question, the Court held it would be unconstitutional to require a 
person "to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he may oppose 
as a condition of holding a job" under a union security arrangement. Justice 
166 Theodore J. St. Antoine 
Powell, joined by the chief justice and Justice Blackmun, asserted that 
there was no basis here for distinguishing "collective bargaining activities" 
from "political activities" for First Amendment purposes. They contended 
that collective bargaining in the public sector is always political in any 
meaningful sense of the word, and the state should have to prove that 
any union dues or fees required of nonunion employees are needed to 
serve paramount governmental interests. 
Neither in Abood nor in other related cases has the Supreme Court ever 
addressed the point that unions, in both public and private employment, 
are apparently being held to stricter constitutional and statutory limitations 
than government itself. The union member can prevent the use of his com-
pulsory dues for political purposes he opposes. The citizen cannot similarly 
prevent the use of his tax money by government officials. If the answer to 
this is that the legitimate governmental functions of civic personnel are 
far broader than the legitimate collective bargaining functions of union 
personnel, we are merely led to the more important practical question that 
so far the Supreme Court has managed to sidestep: How are a union's 
"collective bargaining" activities to be distinguished from its "political" 
activities? How does one classify the congressional testimony of the Agri-
cultural Workers' president in support of federal bargaining rights for farm 
labor? A union gift to the local United Fund in an effort to gain community 
sympathy in forthcoming contract negotiations? A union's expenses in at-
tempting to organize a neighboring plant whose substandard wage scale is 
a threat to an existing bargaining unit? Although the protection of dis-
senters' rights in such cases as Abood can be applauded, sophisticated 
judgment will have to be exercised in fixing the boundaries of activities 
"germane to collective bargaining," or else a union could be unrealistically 
restricted in the use of compulsory dues. 
UNION-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
Despite the focus of the Burger Court's labor cases on individual rights 
in the work place, it has made almost as many decisions that are significant 
to the more traditional law of union-management relations. It is in this 
more conventional area that the greater solicitude of the Burger Court for 
conservative values, such as an employer's property rights and managerial 
prerogatives, becomes most pronounced. In the landmark cases of the Warren 
era dealing with direct union-management confrontations, organized labor 
had a victory record on the order of three to one. In such head~on union-
employer clashes before the Burger Court, management won 55 percent of 
the cases. In addition, the Burger Court expressly overruled two of the 
Warren Court's major prounion decisions33 and significantly cut back or 
undermined three others. 34 For all that, however, it would be a gross over-
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simplification to characterize the Burger Court's record as a sharp reversal 
of a legal trend favoring unionism. It is natural that some of the closer, 
harder cases have arisen as the NLRA has matured; a 55 to 45 division 
is hardly a sign of overwhelming partisanship; and in the early 1980s unions 
actually prevailed more often than employers. 
Union Organizing 
The Burger Court has preserved and even extended the rights of employees 
to engage in union solicitation and the distribution of union literature on 
company premises during nonworking time, although the results have not 
always pleased the chief justice and other Nixon appointees. An employer 
may not forbid such activity even though the incumbent union has entered 
an agreement purporting to waive the employees' solicitation rights. 35 It 
makes no difference whether the employees are opposing or supporting the 
incumbent union. It also makes no difference whether the union literature 
is more political than organizational in nature, such as a pamphlet opposing 
a right-to-work law and supporting a higher minimum wage. 36 
The Burger Court awarded employers one notable victory, 5 to 4, in 
Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB. 31 Unless a company has en-
gaged in unfair labor practices that would preclude a fair election, the ma-
jority held, the company is entitled to insist that a union file a petition 
for an election with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and is 
not obliged to recognize the union on the basis of cards signed by a majority 
of the employees authorizing the union to represent them. The justices did 
not vote simplistically by blocs. There was an unusual, but in these circum-
stances understandable, alliance of some of the most liberal and some of the 
most conservative members of the Court. The employees' interest in the 
freest and best informed choice coalesced with the employer's interest in 
not having to recognize the union until it had an opportunity to dissuade 
the employees from their allegiance to the organization. Justice Douglas 
wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justice Brennan along with 
three Nixon appointees. On the other hand, Justice Powell joined Justices 
Stewart, White, and Marshall in dissent. 
Union Collective Action 
Constitutional Protections 
In Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 38 the Warren 
Court likened a large commercial shopping center to a normal municipal 
business block and held that union picketing of a nonunion retailer there was 
protected under the First Amendment. Ordinarily, of course, constitutional 
guarantees apply only against governmental action, not private action. In 
Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 39 the Burger Court refused to extend this 
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constitutional analysis to union solicitation on the privately owned parking 
lots of a retail establishment. Instead, the proper inquiry was whether the 
nonemployee solicitors had a statutory right of access under the NLRA on 
the theory there were no reasonably available alternative channels of com-
munication. Then, in Hudgens v. NLRB, 40 the Court declared that statutory 
analysis rather than constitutional analysis was also the correct approach 
to union picketing of a retail store in a privately owned, enclosed shopping 
mall. Justice Stewart, for the majority, declared that "the constitutional 
guarantee of free expression has no part to play in a case such as this. "4 ' 
Logan Valley Plaza was expressly overruled. 
The Court seems to have gone out of its way to lay Logan Valley to 
rest, without its "ever having been accorded a proper burial," as dissenting 
Justices Marshall and Brennan put it. Hudgens had to be remanded for a 
determination of the picketers' rights under the NLRA, anyway, and the 
resolution of the statutory question might have mooted the constitutional 
issue. There is merit in the dissenters' complaint that the majority acted 
precipitately in deciding such a "far-reaching constitutional question." Pru-
dence would have counseled waiting for more experience to verify or refute 
the dissenters' claim that "the owner of the modem shopping center com-
plex, by dedicating his property to public use as a business district, to 
some extent displaces the 'State' from control of historical First Amend-
ment forums, and may acquire a virtual monopoly of places suitable for 
effective communication."42 In any event, Logan Valley and Hudgens are 
as good a pair of guides as we have to the respective attitudes of the 
Warren and Burger Courts in balancing free speech and property rights. 
The overruling of Logan Valley Plaza left open a question about the 
continuing vitality of a significant dictum in Justice Marshall's majority 
opinion in that case. After making the obvious point that the patrolling 
element in picketing permits it to be regulated as a form of physical con-
duct, Justice Marshall went on to stress the "purpose" or "objective" of the 
picketing as the crucial factor in determining whether its message may 
constitutionally be prohibited or restricted. The cases where bans on picketing 
have been upheld, he stated, "involved picketing that was found either 
to have been directed at an illegal end . . . or to have been directed to 
coercing a decision by an employer which, although in itself legal, could 
validly be required by the State to be left to the employer's free choice."43 
That test would still leave formidable questions for resolution. But it would 
have the great virtue of focusing attention, as in other free speech inquiries, 
on the content of the communication, and not on the form it takes. It seems 
regrettable if the overruling of Logan Valley's balancing of free speech 
and property rights, when the location of the communicator was the issue, 
should carry over to Justice Marshall's perceptive words on the wholly 
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different issue of the constitutional status of the picketers' message, regard-
less of their location. 
In 1980, however, the Supreme Court so extended the "unlawful objec-
tives" test for the constitutionality of picketing bans as to strip it of almost 
all practical meaning. In NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001 
[Safeco]44 it held that picketers asking customers not to buy a nonunion 
product being distributed by a second party was an unlawful boycott of the 
distributor where the distributor derived 90 percent of its income from 
sales of the picketed product. There was no indication that the picketing 
was intimidating in any way. Six justices considered the prohibition justified 
constitutionally by Congress's purpose of blocking the "coercing" or "em-
broiling" of neutrals in another party's labor dispute. 
Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented. But strangely they con-
fined themselves to the statutory argument that the NLRA does not forbid 
consumer picketing aimed only at a particular nonunion product, as dis-
tinguished from the neutral distributor's business as such. The dissenters 
had nothing to say about what even concurring Justice Blackmun termed the 
"Court's cursory discussion of what for me are difficult First Amendment 
issues."45 No justice dealt adequately with the question of how a union 
could constitutionally be prevented from asking individual members of the 
public not to purchase a designated nonunion product. Where was the "il-
legal end" within the meaning of Justice Marshall's Logan Valley formula-
tion? Even if picketing addressed to an organized group like a union can 
be characterized as a "signal" calling for an "automatic response," rather 
than speech seeking a "reasoned response," is that also a proper char-
acterization, as concurring Justice Stevens suggested, when the picketing 
is addressed to individual consumers exercising their own personal choice?46 
The Court has failed to provide a convincing rationale for distinguishing 
constitutionally between a "Do Not Purchase" appeal conveyed through a 
Nader-sponsored newspaper advertisement and a similar message conveyed 
through picketing, the working person's standard means of communication. 
Even the element of face-to-face confrontation (and arguable psychological 
coercion) cannot be the key if, as Justice Stevens maintains, distributing 
handbills is also to be placed in a different category from picketing because 
the former depends "entirely on the persuasive force of the idea." 
Work Preservation and Changing Technology 
If Local 100 calls a strike against Ace Manufacturing Co. to get better 
wages and working conditions, that is traditional, lawful "primary" activity. 
But if Local 100 asks the employees of Black Retailer to strike Black to 
force it to stop handling Ace's products until Ace settles with the union, 
that is a classic "secondary boycott" and forbidden by section 8(b)(4)(B) 
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of the NLRA. So too, if Black agrees with Local 100 not to handle Ace's 
products until Ace settles, that is a contractual secondary boycott, a so-
called hot goods clause, and forbidden by section 8(e) of the act. In each 
instance Local 100 is using its leverage against Black, a neutral, secondary 
party, to secure an objective elsewhere-at Ace, the primary party to the 
dispute. But suppose Ace agrees with Local 100 that it will keep within 
the plant all work traditionally done by Local 100 members and not sub-
contract any to White Subcontractor. This "no-subcontracting" clause pre-
vents employer dealings, just as the Local 100-Black agreement does. But 
here White is not the target; the objective is "work preservation" for Ace's 
own employees. This is also recognized as lawful primary activity, the 
Supreme Court's touchstone being that it is "addressed to the labor relations 
of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees.''47 
The problem gets stickier if a "product boycott" is involved. Suppose 
the employer is a building contractor whose carpenters have traditionally 
cut and fitted doors for installation at the job site. The contractor has 
agreed with the carpenters union that it will not use "prefitted" doors, which 
have been prepared by the manufacturer for immediate installation without 
further cutting and fitting. Despite this agreement, the contractor goes ahead 
and orders prefitted doors. The union strikes to prevent their use. In Na-
tional Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB48 the Warren Court held, 
5 to 4, that such a strike was essentially concerned with ''job preservation," 
the carpenters' traditional work of cutting and fitting doors at the con-
struction site, and that it was therefore primary activity and not an unlawful 
secondary boycott. Four dissenting justices maintained that the union's con-
duct fell squarely within the language of section 8(b)(4)(B)-"forcing ... 
any person to cease using . . . the products of any other producer"-and 
that product boycotts in particular have consistently been regarded as a 
proscribed secondary boycott. 
The Burger Court had to handle a product boycott with an added wrinkle. 
After agreeing to a standard work preservation clause in a union contract 
that precluded the use of certain prefabricated climate controls, the con-
tractor went ahead and entered into a construction subcontract that speci-
fied the use of prefabricated units. The union refused to install the units. 
The Supreme Court held that this refusal violated section 8(b)(4)(B) in 
NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters Local 638. 49 The majority reasoned 
that the product specifications contained in the employer's subcontract with-
drew its "right of control" over the work in dispute, and thus the union's 
action was not directed at the contractor's labor relations "vis-a~vis his 
own employees," the accepted test for primary activity. The majority ap-
parently regarded the general contractor that had imposed the specifications 
as the real target of the union pressure. Justices Brennan, Stewart, and 
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Marshall dissented on the quite forceful ground that the Enterprise result 
could not be squared with National Woodwork. Certainly it is hard to see 
how an employer's voluntary surrender of its "right of control" could meta-
morphose a union's lawful primary pressure into an illegal secondary boy-
cott. Justices as sensitive to property rights as the majority in Enterprise 
should have remembered that the farmer who sells a cow to one buyer 
usually cannot tum around and sell the same cow to someone else. One 
might have suspected that the majority in Enterprise was basically at odds 
with National Woodwork itself. Enterprise gave priority to technological 
change and the flexibility of business arrangements over the capacity of 
unions to protect their members' jobs. That may be entirely supportable as 
a matter of economics, but it hardly squares with secondary boycott con-
cepts. In any event the Supreme Court has long professed that such basic 
policy choices are the peculiar province of Congress. 
Three years after Enterprise, a 5 to 4 majority of the Supreme Court 
somewhat surprisingly took a step back toward National Woodwork. In 
NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 50 the Court had to deal with 
work preservation in a situation where, as frequently happens, the work 
the union was trying to "preserve" had undergone a transformation because 
of technological innovation-here, containerized shipping. The ILA had 
agreed with a shippers association that ILA labor would have the job of 
"stuffing" or "stripping" all containers within a fifty-mile radius of a port, 
and that a royalty would be paid on any containers passing over the piers 
intact. The NLRB concluded that since the ILA's members had never per-
formed off-pier stuffing or stripping, it was engaged in illegal work acquisi-
tion rather than permissible preservation of work within its traditional juris-
diction. The chief justice and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens 
accepted this view. But the majority disagreed that the determination that 
the work of the longshoremen had historically been the loading and unload-
ing of ships was dispositive. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall declared the question was how the 
parties "sought to preserve that work, to the extent possible, in the face 
of a massive technological change."51 The case was remanded to the labor 
board for initial consideration of whether "the stuffing and stripping reserved 
for the ILA ... is functionally equivalent to their former work," or whether 
"containerization has worked such fundamental changes in the industry that 
the work formerly done at the pier . . . has been completely eliminated." 
Although insisting the board's answer was not preordained, Justice Marshall 
added pointedly: "This determination will, of course, be informed by an 
awareness of the congressional preference for collective bargaining as the 
method for resolving disputes over dislocations caused by the introduction 
of technological innovations in the workplace." A bare majority of the Court 
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was once again prepared to allow a union to defend the humane value 
of job security even at the risk of some loss in industrial efficiency and 
economic progress. 
Federal Preemption and State Trespass Laws 
During the Burger era the Supreme Court has alternately advanced and 
retreated from the preemption line drawn by the Warren Court to exclude 
state substantive law from areas regulated by Congress. The chief justice 
and other Nixon appointees have generally tended to favor retrenchment, 
opening the field to more extensive state regulation. The classic formula-
tion of the Warren Court in the landmark Garmon case52 was that conduct 
"arguably protected" or "arguably prohibited" under the NLRA was subject 
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. States could act only if vital 
local interests, such as the maintenance of public order, were at stake. 
What some commentators viewed as a major departure from Garmon's 
preemption teachings came in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County 
District Council of Carpenters. 53 A store sued a union for trespass in state 
court for picketing on its property. No objection was made to the picketing 
as such, but only to its location. Under federal law, such peaceful picket-
ing on private property was both arguably protected and arguably prohibited. 
The Supreme Court held the arguably prohibited nature of the conduct here 
did not support preemption because the state was not regulating the picket-
ing qua picketing but only as trespassory action affecting vital local inter-
ests. The Court also held that in the peculiar circumstances of this case, 
even the arguably protected element did not justify preemption. The employer 
could not get a ruling from the NLRB on actual protection (it could not 
file charges against itself); only the union could, and it had declined to 
file charges despite the employer's demand that the picketers leave. This 
left the employer defenseless unless it resorted to force or could invoke 
the state's trespass law. After pointing out that under the NLRA an em-
ployer may bar nonemployee union organizers from his property as a "general 
rule," the majority concluded that the "risk of an erroneous state court 
adjudication . . . is outweighed by the anomalous consequence of a rule 
which would deny the employer access to any forum in which to litigate 
either the trespass issue or the protection issue in those cases in which 
the disputed conduct is least likely to be protected by § 7. "54 
Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented, emphasizing that the 
Garmon test "has provided stability and predictability to a particularly com-
plex area of law for nearly 20 years. "55 That practical point is the dissenter's 
strong suit. The majori~y has all the theoretical trumps, especially if con-
curring Justice Blackmun's view that a union's filing of unfair labor practice 
charges with the NLRB displaces state court jurisdiction is eventually ac-
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cepted. Then, only a union bereft of hope of prevailing before the board 
would be consigned to the sometimes dubious mercies of state court judges. 
Collective Bargaining 
Duty to Bargain 
Employers are required by the NLRA to bargain with the representative 
of their employees concerning "wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment."56 Over the last two decades, the most controversial 
issue concerning the duty to bargain has been the extent to which employers 
must negotiate about managerial decisions that result in a shrinkage of 
employee job opportunities. Examples include subcontracting, automation, 
and plant relocations. Under established precedent, the crucial question is 
whether a subject is classified as a "condition of employment" or as a man-
agement right. 57 In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. Nl1UJ, 58 the Warren 
Court gave limited approval to the labor board's expansion of the range of 
so-called mandatory bargaining. It sustained a board order that a manu-
facturer bargain over subcontracting out its maintenance work within a plant. 
The Court emphasized that this did not alter the company's "basic opera-
tion" or require any "capital investmer.L" There was simply a replacement 
of one group of employees with another to do the same work in the same 
place under the same general supervision. Negotiating would not "signifi-
cantly abridge" the employer's "freedom to manage the business." That nar-
row approach did not reach the issue of subcontracting in general, and cer-
tainly not the issue of more fundamental structural or technological changes. 
The Burger Court revisited the problem, with puzzling results, in First 
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB. 59 It was held that a maintenance 
firm did not have to bargain when it decided to terminate an unprofitable 
contract to provide janitorial services to a nursing home. The Court first 
stated broadly that an employer has no duty to bargain about a decision 
"to shut down part of its business purely for economic reasons."60 But it 
then pointed out that in this particular case the operation was not being 
moved elsewhere and the laid-off employees were not going to be replaced, 
the employer's dispute with the nursing home concerned the size of a 
management fee over which the union had no control, and the union had 
just recently been installed and thus there was no disruption of an on-
going relationship. The Court consequently left unanswered many questions 
regarding the more typical instance of a partial closing or the removal of 
a plant to a new location. 
Imposing a duty to bargain about managerial decisions such as subcon-
tracting, plant removals, and technological innovation would obviously de-
lay transactions, reduce business adaptability, and perhaps interfere with 
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the confidentiality of negotiations with third parties. In some instances bar-
gaining would be doomed in advance as a futile exercise. Nonetheless, 
the closer we move toward recognizing that employees may have something 
akin to a property interest in their jobs, the more apparent it may become 
that not even the employer's legitimate regard for profit making or the 
public's justified concern for a productive economy should totally override 
the workers' claim to a voice in the decisions of ongoing enterprises that 
will vitally affect their future employment opportunities. A moral value 
is arguably at stake in determining whether employees may be treated as 
pawns in management decisions. Often negotiations may benefit both parties 
by producing a less drastic solution than a shutdown or a relocation. At 
the very least, bargaining may serve a therapeutic purpose. As the Supreme 
Court put it in Fibreboard, in words that might sound platitudinous but 
for the grim historical reality behind them, the labor act "was framed with 
an awareness that refusals to confer and negotiate had been one of the 
most prolific causes of industrial strife. "61 
One of the persistent complaints about the National Labor Relations Act 
is the inadequacy of the remedy against an employer who unlawfully re-
fuses to recognize or bargain with a majority union. Two or three years, 
and sometimes much longer, after the event, a recalcitrant employer will 
finally be subject to a judicially enforced order to bargain. Many critics 
insist that this is hardly more than a pious exhortation that the wrongdoer 
go and sin no more. Rarely will there be any financial repercussions. The 
employees receive nothing to make them whole for the losses they may have 
suffered by being denied the benefits of collective bargaining for several 
years. Apparently this situation will continue. In H. K. Porter Co. v. 
NLRB62 an employer engaged in bad-faith bargaining over an eight-year 
period. The dispute mainly revolved around the company's unjustified re-
fusal to agree to "check off" union membership dues from the employees' 
pay. Perhaps in exasperation, after several rounds of NLRB proceedings and 
court remands, the board at last ordered the employer to grant a checkoff 
provision. The Supreme Court held this was beyond the board's remedial 
powers. 
The Court emphasized that a fundamental policy of the NLRA was "not 
to allow governmental regulation of the terms and conditions of employ-
ment, but rather to ensure that employers and their employees could work 
together to establish mutually satisfactory conditions. "63 Although the Court 
conceded that the congressional expression of this policy was contained in 
the section of the act defining the duty to bargain, it believed that the 
policy against imposing substantive contract terms should also extend to 
remedying proven violations. Its fingers thus burned, the NLRB has felt 
inhibited by the judgment in H. K. Porter from fashioning novel and po-
tentially effective remedies for employer refusals to bargain, such as "make-
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whole" monetary relief for employees deprived of the fruits of collective 
bargaining. This has been true even though technically no continuing con-
tract terms need be imposed, as occurred in H. K. Porter, and at most the 
putative contract that might have resulted from good-faith negotiations would 
simply be used as a measure of the employees' past losses. 
Arbitration and Contract Enforcement 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act generally prohibits the federal courts from issuing 
injunctions against peaceful strikes. When Congress in section 301 of the 
Taft-Hartley Act gave the federal courts jurisdiction over suits to enforce 
labor contracts, it deliberately rejected proposals to amend Norris-LaGuardia 
to take account of this new development. In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkin-
son,64 the Warren Court made the obvious, logical deduction. Even strikes 
in breach of contract remained covered by Norris-LaGuardia's ban on federal 
injunctions. But there were evident policy deficiencies in this position. Most 
important, employers were deprived of what was often the most efficacious 
and sensible weapon against forbidden strikes. In the first year of the Burger 
era, the Supreme Court in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770 65 
managed to confound the logic of Sinclair (and probably the intent of 
Congress) and do justice at last. A crafty opinion by Justice Brennan de-
clared that Congress's refusal to amend Norris-LaGuardia when enacting 
Taft-Hartley did not mean the injunction ban was left intact. It merely 
meant Congress was prepared to leave to the federal judiciary the task of 
working out an appropriate "accommodation" between the two statutes. 
Justice Brennan's solution was to authorize federal injunctions against strikes 
where the underlying grievance is subject to a "mandatory grievance adjust-
ment or arbitration procedure" in a collective bargaining agreement. While 
it may offend purists in statutory construction, this rule has much to com-
mend it in elementary fairness. Norris-LaGuardia was designed to protect 
struggling unions against a biased and injunction-wielding judiciary, es-
pecially in organizing settings. When an established union has committed 
itself contractually not to strike and has been provided an effective alterna-
tive means of redress through arbitration, it is hardly a desecration of 
Norris-LaGuardia philosophy to grant the employer an injunction if the 
union goes back on its word and strikes. 
The Burger Court has applied the Boys Markets test for injunctive re-
lief with surprising literalness in favor of labor organizations. Thus, in 
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 66 the Court held no injunction was avail-
able against a sympathy strike that was arguably a violation of the union's 
no-strike pledge. The key was that the strike was in support of other unions 
negotiating with the employer. The strike was not triggered by a dispute 
between the employer and the striking union, and hence the union had 
no grievance it could resolve through arbitration under its own contract. 
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Remedies other than an immediate injunction were of course available to 
the employer, including here resort to arbitration. The Supreme Court's 
continuing endorsement of arbitration as a centerpiece of national labor 
policy was further underscored in Nolde Bros. v. Bakery Workers Local 
358. 67 In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held arbitrable "a 
dispute which arises under the contract," even though "based on events that 
occur after its termination. "68 The dispute arose over severance pay called 
for in a contract that had expired four days before the company decided 
to close its plant permanently. 
In two decisions involving "successor" employers, the Burger Court 
blurred, if it did not eradicate, major Warren Court teachings on the nature 
of the collective bargaining agreement. The earlier view was that it was 
"not an ordinary contract," but a "generalized code" setting forth "the com-
mon law of a particular industry or of a particular plant."69 A predecessor's 
labor contract, in the Warren period, could bind a successor employer where 
there was "substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise," 
without regard to the existence of actual consent. In the Burns International 
Security70 and Howard Johnson7' cases, the Burger Court refocused attention 
on traditional common law notions of the need for "consent" under "normal 
contract principles," and on the question of whether certain rights and duties 
were "in fact" "assigned" or "assumed." 
On their facts, Burns and Howard Johnson held a predecessor's labor 
contract not binding on a rival company that supplanted the predecessor 
through competitive bidding or on a purchaser who retained only a minority 
of the seller's employees. This left open the possibility that the Warren 
successorship doctrine might still apply where there was a genuine link 
between predecessor and successor and a majority of the former's employees 
remained with the latter. What was more likely reflected here, however, 
was a clash of fundamental values in the labor area. The Warren majority 
was concerned about protecting employees against a sudden and unforeseen 
loss of bargaining and contract rights. There was also a concern about 
maintaining industrial stability and labor peace, through reducing the number 
of representation elections and· sustaining the life of .labor agreements. On 
the other hand, the Burger majority laid stress on the freedom and volun-
tariness of the collective bargaining process, on the importance of saddling 
neither unions nor employers with substantive contract terms to which they 
have not agreed. Stress was further laid on providing maximum flexibility 
in business arrangements, so that employers may respond to changing mar-
ket conditions without being straitjacketed by the bargaining or contractual 
obligations that may have been assumed by imprudent predecessors. The 
future development of successorship law undoubtedly depends far more on 
the way the members of the Supreme Court ultimately balance out these 
competing values than on any logical deductions from the decisions to date. 
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Antitrust 
The leading candidate as the Burger Court's most mangled labor decision 
would have to be Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Loca/100.72 The 
fault was not entirely the Burger Court's. Connell was only the latest in a 
long line of cases in which the Supreme Court has essayed the well-nigh 
futile task of reconciling age-old union restrictive practices with the strictures 
of the antitrust laws. The two worlds are fundamentally at odds. The es-
sence of antitrust philosophy is the promotion of competition; the essence 
of unionism is the elimination of competition, at least the elimination of 
wage competition among all employees doing the same job in the same 
industry. An uneasy truce has prevailed whenever the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the antitrust laws have little if any place in dealing with 
restraints in the labor market, that is, the area of wages, hours, and working 
conditions, and that antitrust doctrines should largely be confined to re-
straints in the product market, the commercial sale of goods and services. 
Improper union restraints are more appropriately regulated through labor 
legislation, tailored to fit the peculiar characteristics and behavior of labor 
organizations. 
In Connell a plumbers local picketed a general contractor and secured 
an agreement that the contractor would subcontract mechanical work only 
to firms that had a collective bargaining contract with the union. The con-
tractor then sued the local for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act. In a 
5 to 4 decision the Supreme Court sustained the cause of action. In the 
majority's view, the local had used direct restraints on the commercial 
market to achieve its concededly lawful organizational objective. As stated 
by Justice Powell, the restrictive agreement was designed to force nonunion 
subcontractors out of the market, "even if their competitive advantages were 
not derived from substandard wages and working conditions but rather from 
more efficient operating methods. "73 Viewed solely in antitrust terms this 
makes some sense, although it ignores long-standing precedent that the anti-
trust laws exempt agreements, whether primary or secondary, that are im-
mediately aimed at promoting union organization74 as well as agreements 
that are aimed at eliminating competition over wages and other labor stan-
dards. The principal vice of Justice Powell's majority opinion, however, is 
its total disregard of the necessary implications of applicable labor law. 
When Congress outlawed "hot goods" agreements in section 8(e) of the 
amended NLRA, it recognized the special interrelationship of a general 
contractor and its subcontractors in the construction industry, and added a 
proviso excepting agreements regarding "work to be done" at a job site. 
The acknowledged purpose was to permit unions and employers in the 
building trades to enter "union-only" subcontracting arrangements. Indeed, 
the NLRB's general counsel has expressly declined to issue unfair labor 
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practice complaints against contracts like the one at issue in Connell. 
Justice Powell evaded the force of the 8(e) proviso by engrafting two or 
three qualifications, none of which finds substantial support in the legis-
lative history. The authorization for excluding nonunion contractors, he 
said, "extends only to [subcontracting] agreements in the context of collec-
tive bargaining relationships, and . . . possibly to common-situs relation-
ships on particular jobsites as well. "75 The plumbers' clause barring non-
union subcontracting in Connell failed to meet this test, since the local 
did not seek to represent employees working directly for the general con-
tractor but only the employees of plumbing subcontractors.76 
The egregious failure of the Connell majority to take proper account of 
the policies of the labor laws in working out an accommodation with the 
antitrust laws was the principal focus of Justice Stewart's dissent. The 
plumbers' secondary activity at the Connell site was subject to comprehen-
sive regulation under Taft-Hartley, and antitrust sanctions would necessarily 
upset the balance thus struck by Congress. True, section 303 of the Taft 
Act, providing for actual damages for secondary strikes in violation of 
section 8(b)(4), was not amended in 1959 to cover secondary agreements 
in violation of section 8(e). But that should not have meant, as Justice 
Powell inferred, that the omission of actual damages under Taft-Hartley for 
8(e) violations made them liable to treble damages under Sherman. In the 
hierarchy of labor law values, coercive conduct is almost invariably sub-
ject to more severe sanctions than is an agreement having the same re-
strictive results. 77 It would therefore have been incongruous for Congress 
to prescribe actual damages under section 303 for secondary activity in 
violation of section 8(b)(4), but not for agreements in violation of section 
8(e), all for the purpose of subjecting the latter alone to the much harsher 
remedy of treble damages under the antitrust laws. 
Beyond that misreading of feder:al labor law, perhaps the most disquiet-
ing aspect of the majority's approach was its pronouncement that to permit 
subcontracting agreements with "stranger" contractors, without confinement 
to particular job sites, "would give construction unions an almost unlimited 
organizational weapon. "78 If any lesson should have been learned from a 
century of federal intervention in labor disputes, it is that the Congress 
and not the courts ought to have the primary responsibility for determining 
what economic weapons are allowable to either party in a labor dispute. 
CONCLUSION 
Organized labor is in decline in the United States. While the movement 
has grown to over twenty million, the labor force has expanded more 
rapidly, and union membership has fallen to only 19.7 percent of the total. 79 
That is, proportionately, less than half the union population in Great Britain 
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or Western Europe. And American unions today consistently lose over 50 
percent of the representation elections in which they participate. 80 The princi-
pal cause of membership shrinkage and organizing failures is undoubtedly 
the shift of jobs from the blue-collar to the white-collar sectors. But it 
cannot be wholly coincidental that the period of organized labor's most 
dramatic growth began with the Wagner Act and practically ended with 
Taft-Hartley and that over the past quarter of a century unions have suf-
fered an unbroken string of defeats in congressional battles concerning the 
balance of power between labor and management. At least psychologically, 
and presumably in much more tangible ways as well, the state of the law 
affects a union's capacity to organize and bargain. 
Although the Burger Court's overall record has proved more moderate 
than the labor movement may have anticipated, the Court's secondary boy-
cott and antitrust rulings in the construction industry, its ruling on shopping 
center picketing in retail settings, and its "successorship" rulings in industry 
generally, to mention a few noteworthy examples, tip the scales still further 
against union organizational efforts. Beside the stark statistics on union 
infirmity, the Connell majority's fear that unless section 8(e) of the NLRA 
is read to mean what it does not say, building trades unions would be 
given an "almost unlimited organizational weapon" seems an oddly mis-
placed concern. Federal labor law as written, without any stretching by 
the judiciary, appears more than adequate to suppress nearly any exercise 
of overweening union power. 
The Burger Court's parsing of the statutory rights of individual workers 
has been more consistently defensible, even when controversial. Institu-
tionalists may argue that the Court went too far in applying the duty of 
fair representation in Hines, the case of the altered motel receipts, and 
civil libertarians may contend that it sacrificed minority interests to out-
moded notions of job seniority in cases like Teamsters and Patterson. But 
in weighing those and similar claims under the NLRA, Title VII, and 
Landrum-Griffin, the Court has constantly had to balance one person's 
grievance against the equities of fellow workers and the institutional needs 
of the collective representative of the entire group. All in all, the Court 
has responded sensibly in its handling of individual and minority rights. 
They have generally been accorded the high priority they deserve. At the 
same time, however, the Court has not forgotten that the mass of em-
ployees, too, have rights and that healthy, effective labor organizations 
are the best means yet devised for securing those rights in the work place. 
